Introduction to Repeated Games in Game Theory
One popular strategy for repeated games is called tit-for-tat. This strategy involves starting with a cooperative move and then replicating your opponent's previous move. For example, if your opponent cooperates in the first round, you will also cooperate. If your opponent defects in the second round, you will also defect. This strategy is effective because it is forgiving, meaning it will cooperate again after a defection, but it is also retaliatory, meaning it will defect if the opponent defects.
Another strategy is the grim trigger strategy. This strategy involves starting with cooperation, but if the opponent defects even once, the player will continue to defect for the remainder of the game. This strategy is more punishing than tit-for-tat and can lead to a breakdown in cooperation if the opponent defects early on.
Other strategies include Pavlov, which involves switching between cooperation and defection based on the outcome of the previous round, and win-stay, lose-shift, which involves continuing the same move if it was successful in the previous round and switching if it was not successful.
These strategies can be used in different types of repeated games, such as infinitely repeated games or finitely repeated games. The choice of strategy depends on the specific game and the goals of the players. It is important to note that these strategies are not always successful in achieving a desired outcome and can lead to suboptimal results.
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