Introduction to Metaethics
When it comes to metaethics, one of the key debates is between cognitivism and non-cognitivism. Cognitivists believe that moral claims are truth-apt, meaning that they can be true or false. Non-cognitivists, on the other hand, believe that moral claims are not truth-apt, and instead serve some other function.
Cognitivism is often associated with moral realism, which is the view that there are objective moral facts that exist independently of human belief or opinion. According to moral realists, moral claims can be true or false, and this truth value is determined by the moral facts that exist in the world.
Non-cognitivists, by contrast, are often associated with moral anti-realism, which is the view that there are no objective moral facts. Instead, moral claims serve some other function, such as expressing the speaker's emotions or attitudes.
One way to understand the difference between cognitivism and non-cognitivism is to consider the following example. Suppose someone says, "murder is wrong." A cognitivist would interpret this statement as a claim that can be true or false, depending on whether or not murder really is wrong. A non-cognitivist, on the other hand, might interpret the same statement as an expression of the speaker's disapproval of murder, rather than a claim about the moral status of murder.
Cognitivism and non-cognitivism have important implications for ethical theory and practice. For example, if cognitivism is true, then ethical theories need to account for the existence of objective moral facts. If non-cognitivism is true, then ethical theories need to explain how moral claims can have meaning and importance, even if they are not truth-apt. Furthermore, these debates have implications for how we understand the nature of morality itself, and how we should approach moral questions in our personal and public lives.
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