Introduction to Repeated Games in Game Theory
Experimental studies of repeated games have been conducted in various settings, including laboratories and field experiments. These studies aim to test theoretical predictions and examine the behavior of real-world players in repeated games.
One of the most famous experiments in this field is the prisoner's dilemma tournament, which was organized by Robert Axelrod in the 1980s. The tournament involved computer programs that played the prisoner's dilemma against each other and was designed to test strategies for repeated games. The winning strategy was Tit-for-Tat, which is a simple but effective strategy that involves starting with cooperation and then copying the opponent's previous move in subsequent rounds. Other strategies that performed well in the tournament included Pavlov, which involves switching between cooperation and defection based on the outcomes of previous rounds, and Grim Trigger, which involves defecting permanently after the opponent defects once.
Other experimental studies have examined the impact of communication, reputation, and punishment on repeated game outcomes. For example, studies have shown that allowing players to communicate with each other can lead to more cooperation and higher payoffs. Similarly, studies have shown that the threat of punishment can deter defection and lead to more cooperation. Reputation effects have also been studied, with some studies finding that players are more likely to cooperate with opponents who have cooperated in previous rounds.
Overall, experimental studies of repeated games provide important insights into the behavior of real-world players and the effectiveness of different strategies. These studies help to bridge the gap between theory and practice and can inform policy decisions in areas such as criminal justice and international relations.
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